Japanese perspectives on China

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Summary

- Japan-China relations (1951-2005)
- Japan-China relations (after 2006)
- Contemporary issues and sources of Tension in Japanese-Chinese bilateral relations
- Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama/DPJ and China
Japan and China relations
Japan-China relations (1951-2005)

- On September 4, 1951, the US hosted a peace conference regarding Japan in San Francisco without the participation of China, at which the Peace Treaty regarding Japan was approved unilaterally. Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement on September 18, putting out that the treaty as "illegal" and "invalid". On September 8, Japan and US signed the Security Pact and became allies.

- On April 28, 1952, the Japanese government signed a so-called "Peace Treaty" with the Taiwan authorities. On May 5, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement, expressing strong opposition to the "Peace Treaty" between Japan and the Chiang Kaishek authorities.
On June 2, 1957, the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi visited Taiwan in support for the "recapture" of the Mainland attempted by the Chiang Kaishek authorities. On July 25, Premier Zhou Enlai denounced Kishi's hostile policy towards China.

Officially Japan was anti-China, pro-Taiwan to placate the US.

In 1962 an unofficial trade agreement was signed.

February 1972 visit by Nixon to Beijing to normalise relations with China

On September 25, 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka visited Beijing and signed a communiqué establishing full diplomatic relations. Japan abandoned ties with Taiwan.

The restoration of the diplomatic relations between the two countries came true.

• On June 1982, the Japanese Education and Culture Ministry reinterpreted the history of invading China through reviewing its textbooks. Thus the first textbook incident arose.

• On October 23, 1992, Japanese Emperor Akihito and Empress Michito visited China, the first ever by Japanese Emperor. It filled in the gaps in the history of Sino-Japanese relations.
On August 15, 1995, Prime Minister Murayama made a speech on the history issue at the 50th anniversary of World War II, stating clearly that Japan recognized and would face directly the history of its invasion against other countries. Japanese government expressed deep introspection and apology over it.

Since the year 2001, the issues of history textbooks and the paying of homage to the Yasukuni Shrine have done severe harm to the China-Japan relations.
Japan-China relations after 2006

Japan-China relations have improved dramatically since October 2006

总理 Abe made his first official visit to China to meet with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao (The first bilateral meeting between the two countries since 2001).

Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April 2007 and Prime Minister Fukuda visited China in December 2007

President HU made an official visit to Japan in May 2008.

The first ice was broken and spring has come……
In 2008, a joint statement: a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests”

- An agreement between China and Japan to collaborate on regional and global issues (UN Security Council reform, climate change, human rights)
Contemporary issues and sources of Tension in Japanese-Chinese bilateral relations
1. War legacy

Japanese lack of appreciation of sensitivity

(1) Text book row (1982 and onwards)
• Tried to change a phrase that said “Japan invaded Northern China” to have it read “Japan advanced...” instead. ⇒ China protected this attempted censorship.
• There is no mention of the Rape of Nanking.
Visit to Yasakuni Shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers

Miki Takoe in 1975, Nakasone in 1985 and Koizumi in 2001-2007 ⇒ China and South Korea protested and demanded Koizumi to visit their countries to apologize.

• Yasukuni Shrine was built in 1879 by the Emperor Meiji as a focal point for honouring militarism during the war.
• In 1946, the shrine was returned to the Shinto religious sector.
• In 1979 at the 100-year anniversary of its founding, the names of 1068 convicted WWII criminal were secretly added to the roster.
• Dedicated to those who lost their lives in the name of the Emperor (the spirits of over 2.5 million people, including several class ‘A’ war criminals)
• Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the shrine afterwards.
• Emperor Akihito has never visited the shrine.
• PM Hatoyama said he would not visit Yasukini Shrine.
• Yasukuni museum presents a strikingly different interpretation of history from that familiar to Westerners, Chinese, Koreans, or indeed most Japanese (glorifying Japan’s aggressive militaristic past?)

Japanese PM Avoids War Shrine Visit
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OsAwy03bAw&feature=related

Yasukuni Shrine website:
http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/index.html
First post-war visit to China by a Japanese Emperor in 1992 to express regret for Japanese atrocities

- Akihito expressed an informal apology for the Japanese atrocities committed during Japanese occupation of China which resulted in death or injury to an estimated 21 million people.
The Senkaku islands were claimed by Japan in January 1895 because they had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China.

The dispute appears to date from the 1968 announcement by two Japanese scientists that there may be large reservoirs of oil under the continental shelf below the islands.

From the end of World War II, the US occupied Okinawa and controlled the islands. The islands were returned to Japan as part of the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. Since then, the Senkaku Islands have been under the administrative control of the Government of Japan.
Japan claims that the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to territories (including the Senkaku Islands) under the administration of Japan. Recently, Prime Minister Aso said that Japan and the US would work together to deal with any attack by a third country on the Sengoku Islands. The islands are Japan's territory and thus subject to the security alliance with the U.S.

Both China and Japan have offered joint development of the resources as a means of moving forward with development, but the areas in which joint development has been offered have not been agreed to. China has offered joint development of the gas fields north of Senkaku Islands, sidestepping the sovereignty issue. Japan has offered joint development of the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field, sidestepping the sea boundary dispute. To date, neither side has accepted the other’s offer.
3. Human rights

Not an issue - Tianamen 1989

Japanese position – down graded diplomatic ties and limited range of sanctions. Behind the scenes ensured that China was not isolated as believed economic engagement was the best method to reform the country
4. Trade and economic relations increased economic interdependency and desire to expand massive trade flows.

Yet also a fear of being swamped by Chinese goods and illegal Chinese migrants (popular perception in Japan is that Chinese gangsters are bringing in drugs and guns and are responsible for increase in criminal activity in Japan)

- Competition for economic leadership in North Asia
5. The rise and fall of the “China economic threat theory”

- China has achieved average annual growth rates of 9.7 percent over the past 30 years and is on course to become the world’s second largest economy by 2015. Until recently, many Japanese policymakers and businesses saw China’s economic rise and inexpensive labor force as a threat to Japan’s economy.

- Most large Japanese firms now see the Chinese market not as a threat but as a valuable business opportunity.

- If China’s economic growth continues at a pace close to current rates, by 2030 China’s economy will not only have caught up but will be several times larger than Japan’s.

Are the Japanese people, who have long enjoyed their country’s reputation as the world’s second most powerful economy, ready to accept these changes?
6. China’s military expansion

Japanese anxiety about China’s military expansion stems from two distinct but related issues:

(1) China’s rapidly rising defense expenditures and capabilities

• China’s double-digit increases in defense spending over the last decade have attracted a substantial amount of international attention. Following a 17.6% increase (to US$59 billion) in 2008, China’s spending now ranks second only to that of the US.

• Several provocative naval maneuvers by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in and around Japan’s exclusive economic zone in recent years, coupled with longstanding friction over territorial disputes, make it clear why Japan is concerned about China’s military strength.
(2) the relative lack of transparency in China’s defense budget, which exacerbates uncertainties about China’s strategic intentions.

- a lack of transparency concerning the allocation of funds exacerbates existing concerns about the rapid pace of its military expansion.

- Many experts claim that China does not include costs related to research and development, overseas weapon procurements, or support of the paramilitary People’s Armed Police in its calculation, thus suggesting that the official budget represents only a fraction of actual expenditures.
Unfortunately, however, 10 or 15 years from now the US-Japan alliance may no longer be able to provide a sufficient hedge against the military capabilities of China. In order to ensure that China’s rise does not foment instability in the region, Japan and the United States must work together to consolidate inclusive multilateral frameworks throughout East Asia and gradually establish a norm of addressing problems in a cooperative manner.

Any attempt to contain China would be a suicidal act.

Are China and Japan beginning a new arms race? 01 Sep 07
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iz-RWppsvzE&feature=channel
China seems to be gradually embracing a role as both a regional and a global political superpower.

- resource diplomacy in Africa and South America
- Actively push for a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area/ASEAN Plus 3
- Create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to consolidate ties with its neighbors in Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was founded in 2001 by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. SCO is an intergovernmental mutual-security organization.
China and ASEAN

- China entered into TAC in 2003.
- China strongly supports the ASEAN +3 concept for reasons based on maximising its own economic development and the facilitation of regional integration.
- ASEAN receives benefits from Chinese economic development through regionalism.
  - East Asian states would view China more favourably and with less apprehension.
- The key to East Asian regionalism is the improvement of relations with Japan.??
China will probably maintain its policy of “peaceful development” for the immediate future. However there are legitimate concerns in Japan about how China’s foreign policy line will change once it has completed its “rise.” Will it become more aggressive once it has the capabilities necessary to pursue its interests with force, or will it abide by President Hu’s pledge to pursue its interests peacefully within the existing global system?
The fact that China is not a liberal democracy limits the extent to which the international community can trust China’s commitments and the degree to which China can “build confidence” with other powers, such as Japan and the United States.

The illicit entry of a Chinese submarine into Japanese waters in 2004 and the satellite incident in 2007 have raised doubts about the degree of civilian control over the PLA.

Whether the international community or international system can sustain and accommodate the thrust of Chinese growth is another concern.

The concept of China as the ‘Middle Kingdom” – As China continues to develop rapidly economically and militarily, China will aim to become the dominant player (hegemony) in Asia, if not the world.
8. An enhanced triangular structure has emerged – US-Japan-China

- For Japan the triangular structure can enhance Japan’s political status but also represents hazards:
  - Japan could be by-passed in a US-China power struggle
  - Japan could be caught in a tug of war between China and the US.
  - Security dialogue with the US will deepen confidence building and promote further transparency of both military capabilities and strategic intentions.
  - Japan should persuade the US to maintain its military presence in the region and stay involved in efforts to consolidate intraregional ties through such multilateral initiatives as the East Asia Summit.
Prime Minister Hatoyama/DPJ and China
PM Hatoyama and China

- Positive attitude toward China.
- Hatoyama has indicated that he will not be visiting the Yasukuni Shrine – will consider building a religiously and politically neutral “alternative monument” to remember the war dead.
- Hatoyama will not contain China – He has hinted that he will drop “valued diplomacy” which refers to the need for Japan to forge a partnership with Asia-Pacific countries (The US, Australia, India), which follow the standard Western democratic model. However this has been regarded by China as yet another version of an “encirclement policy”
Sengaku Islands – Hatoyama said Japan and China should focus on seeking joint economic advancements while shelving their differences. Regional integration can defuse territorial disputes. He argues that the fruits of economic synergy will persuade parties to sovereignty-related conflicts to opt for joint development by setting aside their disagreements.
Will the DPJ prove to be a game-changer for Japan-China relations?

- How soon Hatoyama and his key aides will visit China
- How soon China will dispatch Vice-President Xi Jinping (likely succeed Hu Jintaotao in 2012) to Japan to bolster good ties.
- Financial and economic cooperation (currency swap, China-Japan trade in Yen or Yuan, not the US dollar)
- Joint development of gas-fields under the East China Sea – President Hu and PM Fukuda reached agreement, however, a formal bilateral treaty has to be signed.
Conclusion

Leaders in both countries have finally come to realize that confrontation serves neither country’s interests and that both have much to gain from enhanced cooperation.

While the warming of bilateral ties since the autumn of 2006 has been remarkable, relations between the two nations remain in a fragile state.
End of lecture